Patients' cognitive complaints and subsequent performance on neuropsychological tests often fail to relate. This could, in part, be caused by a Babylonic incongruence between laypeople's and experts' use of cognition words or "jargon." The present study examined the concurrency of experts and laypeople for 18 neuropsychological tests in the cognitive domains "language," "memory," "attention/concentration," "perception," and "thinking" (executive functioning). This was done by correlating the classifications of the laypeople and experts for individual tests and within each domain. A high domain concurrency was found, indicated by domain correlations of the classifications between laypeople and experts ranging from r s ¼.79 to .92, with exception of the domain "attention" (r s ¼.32). Importantly, with respect to the classification of each individual test in a cognitive domain, large variations in correlations were found, ranging from r s ¼.30 up to r s ¼1.0. These results indicate that there is agreement between the concepts laypeople use and the theory-based concepts of the experts. Our study also offers valuable insight for the clinical practice: tests with a high correlation should be used to aid the clarity of communication in the clinical practice, for instance when giving feedback on performance.
Introduction
Traditionally, neuropsychological assessment is focused on assisting in the diagnosis of behavior and cognitive functioning in relation to cerebral dysfunction. As neuropsychological assessment typically starts with a detailed assessment of cognitive complaints of patients, much emphasis is placed on these complaints. Both laypeople and experts make use of "cognition words" to describe or verify performance on the cognitive domains, such as discussing difficulty in "remembering" or "thinking." The specific terms that patients refer to are "translated" by experts to formulate (working-)hypotheses on cognitive impairment and to design a suitable test battery. Moreover, expert terminology such as the concepts "memory," "attention," or "executive functioning" is applied in communication between experts and patients. This happens for instance when the expert provides feedback on the results of a neuropsychological assessment to the patient. In doing so, it is assumed that experts and laypeople use the same language with respect to cognitive concepts. The often "simple" cognition words used to describe a cognitive concept, for instance "memory," offer safety in apparent simplicity and could in fact be interpreted as misleading with respect to the underlying complexity of the concept. The assumption that the concepts used by experts and laypeople are the same has to our knowledge never been studied, even though there are signals that these concepts might differ. Studies designed to look into the relation between complaints of laypeople and laypeople's cognitive performance often fail to demonstrate clear associations. Explanations for the weak relationship between cognitive complaints and cognitive performance on neuropsychological assessment are lacking at present (e.g., Jungwirth et al., 2004; Mol, van Boxtel, Willems, & Jolles, 2006; Reid & Maclullich, 2006) .
In the last decades, neuropsychological assessment has been used increasingly to assist in questions about everyday cognitive (dis)abilities, for example, a person's suitability for a rehabilitation program, the ability to go to work, or manage finances (e.g., Kalechstein, Newton, & van Gorp, 2003) . The extent to which performance on neuropsychological tests corresponds to real-world performance has therefore been stressed ("ecological validity," see Burgess, Alderman, Evans, Emslie, & Wilson, 1998; Chaytor & Schmitter-Edgecombe, 2003) . Test batteries, such as the Behavioral Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS; Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie, & Evans, 1996) , the Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test (RBMT; Wilson, Cockburn, & Baddeley, 1985) , and the Test of Everyday Attention (TEA; Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway, & Nimmo-Smith, 1994) have been specifically developed to fit this purpose. In order to narrow the gap between the clinical practice and performance in the real world, ecological valid tests were designed to represent real-world equivalents. Despite these efforts, a possible gap between laypeople and experts, between real world and clinical practice can persist. Insight of what neuropsychological tests measure in the eyes of laypeople has yet to be studied.
One of the questions largely overlooked with respect to the lack of concordance between complaints and subsequent test performance is whether the theoretical constructs of cognitive domains used by experts are concordant with the intuitive knowledge that laypeople have about these cognitive abilities. Based on the demands patient care nowadays has on clinicians, it is extremely valuable for the clinical practitioner to know whether the concepts experts apply are transferable to their patients. Subsequently, to aid in communicating with patients, information is needed on which tests best serve as representative examples of a certain cognitive function. For that reason, the present study investigated the concurrency between theory-based cognitive concepts and laypeople's subjective assessment of these concepts of 18 commonly employed neuropsychological tests.
Methods

Participants
Twenty-eight laypeople of Caucasian descent, 15 men, were included in the present study. They were healthy control participants in a larger study on cognition after stroke at the University Medical Center, Utrecht, the Netherlands. Recruitment was through word of mouth and advertisements. The laypeople had to be functionally independent and Dutch-speaking. Exclusion criteria were a psychiatric or neurological disorder that could influence cognitive functioning, and a history of alcohol and/or substance abuse. Mean age was 63.4 + 7.5 years. Median level of education was 6 (range 1 -7; Verhage, 1964) which corresponds to 13.7 + 3.1 years of education. The participants received refunds for their travel expenses. An expert group of Caucasian descent was also recruited, consisting of 14 experienced clinical neuropsychologists practicing in the field of clinical neuropsychology (three men, mean age 37.2 + 10.1, level of education 7, corresponding to at least 18 years of formal education). These two groups were not matched on demographic variables such as age, gender, and level of education, but chosen to represent actors in daily clinical practice as closely as possible.
Procedure
All participants were required to classify 18 commonly used neuropsychological tests into one or more predefined cognitive domains. To acquaint the laypeople with the tests, this group first completed the test battery, which took approximately 2 h. Identical to clinical practice, test administration was preceded by a short structured interview in which possible cognitive complaints were recorded. These questions were organized by cognitive domain and introduced as such. The experts were not required to perform the tests as they were familiar with all 18 tests. The expert group was naïve regarding the purpose of their classifications to prevent this group to anticipate on laypeople's classifications. Eighteen small cards were designed containing a pictorial representation and two-word descriptions of each test (Fig. 1) . All participants were presented with these cards one at the time and were asked to indicate for each test in which of five predefined cognitive domains (see below) they thought this test would fit. If they could not classify a test to a predefined domain, this response was recorded as "no idea." Classification in multiple domains was permitted.
Measures
Eighteen commonly used neuropsychological tests were chosen, covering five major cognitive domains: "language," "memory," "attention," "perception," and "executive functioning" (Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004) . Neuropsychological tests often tap multiple cognitive domains, but it is generally accepted that each test also measures a specific or "key" cognitive function in particular. For example, a word-learning test may involve memory, language functions, and attention, but the "key" concept is memory. Moreover, tests exist that are known to tap more than one domain, such as verbal fluency tests, implicated as reflecting both language abilities and executive functioning. The five domains were subsequently explained to all participants using the terminology: "language," "memory," "attention or concentration," "perception," and "thinking." To convey executive functioning to laypeople, many options were discussed. Each of these possessed one of the aspects of executive functioning, while one description covering executive functioning as close as possible was aimed for. In staying far from descriptives, most options discussed that were equivalent to executive functioning were ruled out. We decided on the term "thinking" because this is the term usually used by lay-people to refer to executive functioning in everyday life.
The following tests were included (domains indicated based on key concepts described by Lezak et al., 2004, or if not available on the test manual):
"Language": National Adult Reading Test (Dutch version), Token Test (short form), verbal fluency using the N, A (both 1 min), and animals (2 min), Boston Naming Test (short form). The instructions of the test manuals were used in the administration of all tests to reflect the clinical practice as close as possible.
Statistical Analysis
Raw classifications were recorded per individual for each single test and the corresponding domain or domains. This results in scores per test for each domain that range from 0 (no participant classified this test in this domain) to 28 (laypersons) or 14 (experts). The number of classifications was compared between the two groups with a Mann -Whitney U-test. To more directly compare the two groups, percentages of the classifications were also computed. Linear regression analyses were performed to examine the potential influence of age and level of education on the percentages of correct classifications (key domain was selected) based on key concepts described by Lezak and colleagues (2004) , or if not available on the test manual.
Since classification in multiple domains was permitted (i.e., a person could classify a test in 0-5 cognitive domains), the classifications were subsequently weighted to correct for multiple classifications. This correction was performed by calculating the weighted fraction per individual for each test by dividing each classification by the total number of classifications that that person gave for that particular test. For instance, if a person classifies a test both in the domain "attention" and memory, this test contributes 0.5 to both domains. If a test is classified in total in three domains, it contributes 0.33 to each domain. If only one classification is given, thus a participant fits a certain test in only one domain; this classification receives a weight of 1 for that test for that domain. The total number of fractions per test were computed for each test and averaged over participants within a group. This results in a mean fraction per test, per domain, and per group.
Correlations were calculated between the mean fractions per group per domain (domain correlations, indicated by Spearman's r for each domain). Correlations between the two groups for the mean fractions per tests were also calculated (test correlations, indicated by Spearman's r for each tests).
Results
The laypeople made use of a median number of 24 (range 19-36) classifications for the 18 tasks, whereas in the expert group, the median number of classifications (Mdn¼49, range 18 -69) was significantly higher (U¼62, p , .001, r¼2.55). The laypeople, giving 700 classifications in total, classified most tests to belong to the domains "perception" (28%), "attention" (24%), or "memory" (23%). The 14 experts gave 609 classifications in total and classified the tests mostly in the domains "attention" (26%), "memory" (23%), and "perception" (22%). Within the group of laypeople, linear regression analyses per domain revealed no significant relation between age and level of education on the percentages correctly classified classifications (all ps . .1). Table 1 shows the (unweighted) percentage of classifications per test in proportions for both groups separately. The expert group showed a tendency to classify tests as belonging to multiple domains. The experts also showed a tendency to classify most tests as belonging to (at least) the domain "attention." This tendency was present to a lesser degree in the laypeople.
To correct for group size and number of classifications, weighted fractions were calculated for each test for each domain for the two groups. These fractions are presented in Fig. 2 (exact fractions are given in the Appendix). In Fig. 2 , Spearman's correlation coefficients were calculated between these weighted fractions of the laypeople and the experts. These correlations were calculated for each individual test and for each domain and indicate the degree of concurrency between the classification made by laypeople and expert. The correlations per domain (in the vertical direction of Fig. 2) show that for the domains "perception," "language," "memory," and "thinking," the correlation ranged from r S ¼.92 through r S ¼.79, whereas for the domain "attention", no significant relationship was found.
Correlations between the two groups on the level of the individual tests (in the horizontal direction of Fig. 2 ) revealed that the Paired Associates Test, the Location Learning Task, and the Line Bisection Test showed the greatest inter-rater concordance (Paired Associates r S ¼1.00, p , .001; Location Learning r S ¼.98, p , .01; Line Bisection r S ¼.92, p , .05). The Token Test showed the lowest concordance of r S ¼.30. The boxes indicate the classifications based on Lezak and colleagues (2004) , showing pattern similarities between the experts' classifications and the classification based on the test theory.
Discussion
In this study, we explored the concurrency between laypeople and experienced clinical neuropsychologists on the domain classifications of neuropsychological tests in the domains "memory," "thinking," "attention," "perception," and "language." The demographics of the two groups were chosen to closely reflect the daily clinical practice, where the patient population is on average middle-aged and of average education, whereas the practitioners are younger and highly educated. Hence, the laypeople in this study were older and had a lower level of education than the expert group. Overall, there was a high correlation (r¼.79 to .92) between laypeople and experts in (both the unweighted and the weighted) classifications of the 18 neuropsychological tests. These results indicate that there is indeed concurrency between the concepts laypeople use and the theory-based concepts of the experts. This could indicate that divergences found between cognitive complaints and subsequent performance on cognitive tasks, as described in the introduction, are not due to a difference in concept utilization between the groups. This divergence could be caused by the fact that "normal" selfawareness of performance of laypeople might implicitly differ from what is assumed in the clinical practice, where normal awareness is thought to be reflected by tests results within the normal range. This issue has also been studied by our group (Schoo et al., submitted) , reporting that laypeople, even though they overestimate, are capable of estimating their own performance on the specific cognitive domains after confrontation with a neuropsychological test battery. Based on these results, it is suggested that future studies look into alternative explanations for this discrepancy, such as depression (Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001 ), or psychological distress in relation to pain (Hart, Wade, & Martelli, 2003) .
Notably, in the aforementioned awareness study by our group, no self-awareness was found for the domain "attention." This is in line with the findings of the current study, where the classification patterns of the two groups for the domain "attention" did not relate significantly. The current results indicates that even though both groups rated a great variety of tests as belonging to this domain (laypeople: 24%, or 168 of 700 total classifications; experts 26%, or 160 of a total of 609 classifications), there was no significant overlap in the pattern of these ratings for both groups. This supports the assumption that the cognitive concept "attention" might be hard to grasp. In neuropsychological literature, attention is considered not to be a unitary construct, but an umbrella term under which the cognitive constructs working memory, top-down sensitivity control, competitive selection, and automatic bottom-up filtering for salient stimuli are placed (Knudsen, 2007) . Based on our results and this multidimensionality of "attention," care should be taken in the clinical practice when interpreting complaints on this domain.
One could argue that undeniably all neuropsychological tests involve multiple cognitive functions, rather than the existence of specific tests tapping specific singular functions. Lezak and colleagues (2004) comment on this issue by stating that to be neuropsychologically meaningful, a test score should, in theory, represent a certain cognitive function as specifically as possible. In practice, however, tests are multidimensional per se, since even for simple in-and output demands various cognitive processes are necessary. Therefore, multidimensionality in neuropsychological assessment is common, even though a test can measure a specific cognitive domain (Lezak et al., 2004) . When asked to classify in domains, this multidimensionality could therefore lead to multiple classifications. Indeed, the classifications in our study show a tendency toward categorization in multiple cognitive domains, suggesting that the experts, and to a lesser extent laypeople, are capable of discerning the multidimensionality of the tests and that laypeople are able to discern multiple cognitive aspects measured by specific tasks. This suggests that the domain-specific assessment of cognitive complaints, which is routine in everyday clinical neuropsychology, appears to be understandable for laypeople. The fact that experts classify the tests in a wider variety of domains than the laypeople do could reflect the awareness of the experts of the multidimensionality of the tests, as well as their representation of cognitive functions in broader theoretical concepts rather than specific tests.
Despite the high concurrency that was found for four of the five domains, there were also notable differences at the level of the individual tests. In both the laypeople and the expert group, a large pattern of variation between the two groups and within the individual participants was found in the extent to which tests were classified in a specific domain or several domains. As a result, concurrencies between the rating pattern of the two groups ranged from low for the Token Test to high concurrency in the case of the Paired Associates (WMS-III). Tests with high concurrency appear to be more representative for a certain cognitive domain than tests with lower concurrency. Consequently, tests for which a high concurrence of classifications is found between the experts and lay people, such as Paired Associates (WMS III), are suitable to use as an example in conveying the results of a neuropsychological assessment to patients.
The present study also shows that within the domain of "attention," no single test or a group of tests was found with adequate concordance between the two groups. Although this may sound as a disadvantage, tests for which low concurrency is found could be particularly useful when decreased effort or limited symptom validity is suspected. Most symptom validity tests are specifically developed to detect domain-specific malingering, for instance the Test of Memory Malingering (Tombaugh, 1996) . Using the concurrency information of our study, tests could be selected to check for symptom validity that in the eyes of the laypeople are low in domain specificity and do not show a clear domain load, such as the Token Test. Feigning low performance on tests with such a low domain load could, in comparison with tests of which domain specificity is more obvious, be less straightforward, reducing a chance of low symptom validity.
Limitations of the present study include the relatively small sample size. However, given the challenges the current field of neuropsychology faces, results of this study do indicate that the current issue should be studied in more detail. Since this study aimed to stay close to the current clinical practice, two groups had to be included who were relatively apart in age and education. The older laypeople could have been thought to interpret concepts such as attention in a manner that was relevant in the era they grew up in. Since the younger group of experts was raised in a different era, concept interpretation could vary between the two groups simply based on this issue. However, in the current study, neither age nor education played a role. The findings of differences in conceptualization between experts and laypeople might also have cross-cultural implications. Concepts of cognition might be influenced by cultural heritage. In line with this assumption, do individuals who have better understanding of the expert field perform better on tests than those who do not have knowledge that is in line with the experts?
The current study operates under the underlying assumption that the tests measure what they were designed for. As mentioned before, (neuro)psychologists often interpret test results for the assessment of more than one domain, which could be an indication that both sensitivity and specificity might be lacking. Even more, in the clinical practice, it frequently occurs that laypeople seek aid for a generalized cognitive deficit, while labeling this as a failure of memory or attention. The use of domains themselves is a matter of discussion within the field of experts, even though for many (neuro)psychologists cognitive tests represent operational definitions of cognitive domains.
In sum, our results show a relatively high concurrency between experts' and laypeople's subjective assessment of the domains several neuropsychological tests belong to, indicating that laypeople are capable of classifying cognition in separate domains. At the same time, on individual test level, a large divergence is found. This offers valuable information for the clinical practice in deciding which tests to select for assessment, taking its intended use into account. Based on our results, professionals should take caution when discussing the results in the domain "attention," as well as interpreting patients' complaints in this domain.
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